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The French labor market and the labor
policies
2 Why unemployment has decreased in France
 Why unemployment has decreased in France less than elswere
 Traditional employment policies
 Early retirement
 Special employment programs
 Reduction of the labor costs
 From « 35 heures » to « Travaillez plus pour gagner plus » (Work
more to earn more)
 The strategy for low wage worker
 An econometric mesure of flexibility
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Why unemployment has decreased
in France ?
4Why unemployment has decreased :  employment
growth
Sources : INSEE, comptes trimestriels ; prévision OFCE, modèle e-mod.fr à partir du troisième trimestre 2006
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5The demographic context : the end of the 
expansion of labor force
Source : INSEE
6The employment policy : cumulative number of special
employment programs
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Why unemployment has decreased
less than elsewhere ?
8Unemployment : Does France perform worse
than Germany ?
Source : Eurostat.
Year-to-year growth rate, in %
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9Growth and demography are more dynamic in 
France
Period Country U Lf Y Prod L D
Slowdown
2001q2-2005q1
France
Germany
1.0
3.2
2.5
2.1
6.3
1.0
4.9
2.5
1.3
-1.4
-2.1
-2.1
Upturn
2005q2-2007q4
France
Germany
-1.4
-2.7
1.3
-0.2
5.6
6.7
2.7
3.7
2.8
2.9
0.2
0.8
Total 
2001q2-2007q4
France
Germany
-0.4
0.5
3.8
1.9
12.2
7.7
7.7
6.3
4.2
1.4
-1.9
-1.3
Notations : unemployment (U), labour force (Lf), GDP (Y), productivity (Prod), employment (L), working-
time duration (D).
Sources : Eurostat, National Accounts comptes nationaux, calculations OFCE.
Changes in points for the unemployment rate, in % for the other variables.
Reference period
• Singificant fall in unemployment in Germany since 2005, but strong increase between mais forte 
2001 and 2005 ;
• More significant fall in France on the entire cycle, that is since the beginning of the slowdown (in 
2001q2).
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Employment Policies
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Early retirement program and « dispenses de recherche 
d’emploi »
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Employment program in public and non-profit sector …
En milliers, stocks
Sources : DARES, calculs OFCE
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Reduction of social contribution on low wages
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Share of un qualified in total unemployment
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Source : INSEE, enquête emploi, calcul de Lemoine (2005).
Légende : Les catégories socioprofessionnelles non-qualifiées regroupent les ouvriers non-qualifiés, les employés de 
commerce et les personnels des services directs aux particuliers.
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Les 35 heures : 
Consequence on French 
Economy?
16
Les 35 heures : consequence ?
 Aubry I et II legislation : macroéconomic outcome
 What consequence on Employment ?
 What consequence on Budget ?
 What consequence for the Costs of production and French competitivity ?
 Fillon 2003 legislation
 Increase of authorized supplemental hours
 Decrease of over-paiement of supplemental hours
 No more link with reduction of working time
 2007 : « Travailler plus pour gagner plus »
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Reduction of working time : a long story with some historical move 
back !
Evolution de la durée collective hebdomadaire (en moyenne annuelle) depuis 1946
dans les entreprises de 10 salariés et plus du secteur marchand non agricole
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Source : enquête ACEMO trimestrielle, DARES
Champ : entreprises de 10 salariés et plus du secteur marchand non agricole
* après refonte, suppression de la distinction 
ouvriers et non ouvriers
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Economic growth was not shocked by 35H regulation
Sources : INSEE, comptes trimestriels
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1997-2002 : Rapid Increase of Employment in France
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No change in the profit share
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Why No Visible Consequence on Costs ?
 35 Hours were paid 39
But this was compensated :
 Wage freeze (On average 18 Month)
 Work Organisation
⇒ Increase in labor and capital productivity
⇒ Duration of Work Calculated on an Annual Basis (Less supplemental
Hours)
 Subsidies
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The Reductions of Social Contributions under 35h Legislation
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Fillon 2003
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 Increase of authorized limits for overtime hours
With an annual limit of 130 hours 37,8 Hours per Week
With an annual limit of 240 hours 39 Hours + 60 suppl. hours
 Reduction of over payment of overtime hours
25 % for the first 8 overtime hours, 50 % over. 
Exception for entreprises of 20 or less than 20 persons : Until 2005, december 31 the first 4 
hours the over pyment is limited to 10 %.
 Break of the link between subsidies and 35 H
 Uniformization of minimum wage
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The final system for Reduction of Social Contribution on Low
Wages
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« Travailler plus pour gagner 
plus », 2007
27
 Lump Sum of Reduction of Social Contribution payed by the Firms
 1,5 € per Supplemental Hour in the firms of less than 20 persons and 0,5 € in the firms of 
more than 20 persons.
 Harmonization of the over payment of supplemental hours
 25 % every where for every supplemental hours.
 Supplemental Hours Are Free of Taxes on Revenue
 Reduction of Social Contributions payed by the employees
 No charges on supplemental Hours
28
The New System for Supplementary Hours in 2007
Salaire en proportion du Smic 1 1.1 1.2 1.33 2.0 
Surcoût d’1 HS       
Entreprises de < 20 salariés -5,2 -3,0 -1,2 0,6 8,0 
Entreprises de > 20 salariés -11,2 -10,3 -9,6 -7,8 -1,7 
Différence de coût entre HS et HN      
Entreprises de < 20 salariés 2,2 5,4 7,8 10,1 18,8 
Entreprises de > 20 salariés 11,0 12,1 13,0 15,3 22,9 
Surcoût d’1 HC       
Entreprises de < 20 salariés -15,4 -13,2 -11,6 -10,0 -6,2 
Entreprises de > 20 salariés -5,0 -4,3 -3,8 -3,3 -2,1 
 
Source : Calcul OFCE
En %
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Some hypothesis about the Impact of the new System for overtime
Hours
 PIB Emploi 
(milliers) 
Chômage Déficit 
(milliards) 
Δh = 0,8 % 0,4 -38 0,1 -3,8 
Δh = 1,6 % 0,5 -157 0,6 -5,1 
Δh = 2,0 % 0,6 -231 0,8 -5,9 
Δh = 3,0 % 0,7 -383 1,4 -7,7 
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Developping low wage jobs
31
A common challenge: mass unemployment
 In France  growth has become richer in labour in the 
1990s, thus limiting unemployment growth
 In Germany productivity growth has even speeded up in 
the 1990s
32
Two different philosophies
 A more interventionnist stance 
in France
 A minimalist intervention in 
Germany until recently as 
labour market policy falls into
the domains of social partners.
 Reasons for change: failure of 
Schroeder’s « Pact for 
Labour » and further
deterioration of the labour 
market situation
33
Similarities
 Passive labour market policies focussing on early
retirement and withdrawals from the labour force
 Subsidized jobs: 
France: social contributions exemptions for young workers in 
vocational training, CEC, public utility jobs and non-profit 
sector
Germany: SAM and ABM, public utility jobs and non-profit 
sector
34
Differences
France
 Minimum wage (SMIC) and 
minimum income (RMI)
 Generalised reduction in 
employer’s social contributions
 Reduction in employer’s social 
contributions focussed on low-
skilled/low-wage workers
 Individual incentives to go back to 
work
Germany
 No minimum wage, minimum 
income (Sozialhilfe)
 Late generalised reduction in 
employer’s social contributions 
(eco-tax and VAT increase)
 Late reduction in employer’s social 
contributions focussed on low-
skilled/low-wage worker (mini/midi 
jobs)
 Late Individual incentives to go 
back to work (Kombilohn, Hartz
laws)
35
Focus on the low-skilled
 Unskilled workers face a specific unemployment issue: competition 
from low wage emerging countries Technical progress and 
capital/labour substitution lead unskilled jobs to disappear in 
industrial sectors and more and more often in some service sectors
 A targeted measure is more efficient than a global measure in terms 
of job creation to budget costs ratios. It is less costly to create low 
wage jobs than higher wage jobs. 
 Lowering the cost of unskilled jobs would allow to create jobs in the 
services to people sector (domestic care, shops, hotels-cafes-
restaurants) that are underdeveloped in France and in Germany 
(Benchmarking Group Report), due to the excessive cost of 
unskilled work. 
36
Differences in low-skilled unemployment
 Low-skilled unemployment was initially lower in Germany than in the EU average. 
 Job destruction in industry in the 1990s increased low-skilled unemployment to more than EU average
 In France early policy measures lowered low-skilled unemployment, which is still higher than EU 
average
1995 2000 2007
Germany
Harmonized unemployment rate 8.2 7.9 8.6
Low-skilled unemployment rate 12.8 12.5 17
Share of long-term unemployment 48.7 51.5 56.6
France
Harmonized unemployment rate 11.9 10.2 8.0
Low-skilled unemployment rate 15.9 15.4 12.3
Share of long-term unemployment 40.3 39.7 40.2
UE
Harmonized unemployment rate 10.8 8.4 7.2
Low-skilled unemployment rate 14.2 11.6 10.9
Share of long-term unemployment 47.8 45.5 42.8
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Reduction in social contributions: France
Prevailing philosophy reducing labour costs
 Social contribution cuts on low wages have been progressively 
implemented since July 1993. 
 Since June 1996, specific social contributions rebates were introduced for 
companies implementing working-time reduction while creating jobs (Loi
Robien, June 1996, Loi Aubry 1, June 1998)
 In January 2000, all companies having signed an agreement on the 35-hour 
week were given contributions’ rebates. The objective was to compensate 
partly for the rises in wage costs resulting from lower working time. 
 Since 2003, the cut was no more linked to the 35-hour working week: a 
single cut was introduced, decreasing from to 1 since 1.7 (then 1.6 SMIC). 
In 2005, it benefited 10.5 million employees. 
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Individual incentives: France
 In 1987, introduction of a minimum income, the RMI, a differential 
benefit for the unemployed accounting for their family situation. In 
principle, the RMI is entitled only to people who make efforts to be 
back on employment, but this restriction does not apply in practice. 
 The gap between wage and insurance benefits incomes is very 
small for unskilled workers, especially when only part-time jobs are 
available. Thus, unskilled workers can fall into an “inactivity trap”. As 
the SMIC aims at ensuring a minimum living standard for workers,
the RMI cannot be significantly lower. So a worker married and 
earning 0.5 SMIC has a lower income than the RMI: his work does 
not pay. 
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Individual incentives: France
 In 1998 a first measure aiming at making work pay on a transitory 
basis was introduced: the RMI incentive (the intéressement). This 
system entitled a RMI earner to continue to benefit from part of the 
RMI in the first year after starting a job, as only half of wage
earnings were taken into account for the calculation of the RMI.
 A working tax credit (Prime pour l’emploi (PPE)) has been 
introduced in 2001 in addition to employers’ contributions cuts. In 
the same time, housing allowances, dwellings taxation, income 
taxation were modified to allow low-wage workers to be entitled to 
benefits previously entitled to RMI earners only.
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Reduction in social contributions: Germany
 Development of mini-jobs (part-time work with monthly wage lower
than 400 euros) with reduced employers’ social contributions
 Hartz II (2003) further development of mini jobs and introduction of 
midi-jobs (between 400 and 800 euros) with progressive cut in 
employers social contributions
Reduced pension rights and no unemployment insurance as cuts are 
not completely financed by  general taxes.
41
Individual incentives: Germany
Prevailing philosophy of getting people back to work rather
than reducing labour costs
 Mini jobs with total exemption of employees’ social contributions 
 Midi jobs with total and partial and degressive exemption of 
employees’ social contributions in order to avoid a low-wage trap
 Pilot experience of Kombilohn (CDU supported), combined wage for 
supporting wages below conventional levels. A social security
subsidy covers part of the employees’ social contribution and family
allowances complete it. 
 Talks on introduction of the minimum wage (SPD suppported)
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Individual incentives: Germany
Prevailing philosophy of getting people back to work rather
than reducing labour costs
 2003 Law and Hartz IV (2005): tougher criteria for job refusal
 2003 Law:  reduces duration of unemployment benefit (from 32 to 18 
months)
 Hartz IV (2005): merges long-term unemployment benefits and 
social aid
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An Econometric Measure of 
Labor Market Flexibility
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German performances based on precarious job 
creations
Sources : Eurostat, National accounts,, calculations
OFCE.
OECD approach
OECD indicators, called Labour Market Regulation indicators, are usually
used to synthetise the rules, which constraint the use of regular/temporary
contracts. Not convincing in the French case.
Temporary jobs
Strategy of flexibility and thus insecurity “at the margin” by creating a two-tier 
labour markets (temporary jobs and in involuntary part-time work).
France Germany
2001 2006 2001 2006
Temporary work (as a % of total employees) 14.9 12.9 12.4 14.2
Involuntary part-time work (as a  % of total 
employment) 2.5 3.8 1.9 4.2
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Comparison of employment flexibility in France 
and Germany
 Labour flexibility: 
 adjustment dynamics of the labour to output fluctuations
 EC models with a time-varying coefficient
 estimated by the Kalman filter.
 Dataset
 Sample: 1980q1-2007q4.
 Source: OECD.
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France: EC model of the labour
 Long term equation of the labour productivity
 Annual growth rate: 2.7% in the 1980’s, 1.8% in the 1990’s
 Short term equation of the labour adjustment to the output 
fluctuations
(-425.4) (74.6) ( 15.9)
log( / ) -4.33+ 0.68% 0.23%Y NH t t U
−
′= ⋅ − ⋅ +
1 1 1(-1.5) (14.9) (1.7)
log( ) -0.03%+0.84 log( )+ log( ) 0.03NH N H tvcoef Y U V− − −Δ = ⋅Δ ⋅Δ + ⋅ +
47
France: time-varying adjustment
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Germany: EC model of the labour
 Long term equation of the labour productivity
 Annual growth rate: 2.7% in the 1980’s, 1.9% in the 1990’s
 Short term equation of the labour adjustment to the output 
fluctuations
(-316.6) (54.8) ( 10.3)
log( / ) -4.38 + 0.68% - 0.20%Y NH t t U
−
′= ⋅ ⋅ +
1 1 1(-4.0) (7.6) (1.5)
log( ) -0.1% + 0.52 log( )+ log( ) 0.01NH N H tvcoef Y U V− − −Δ = ⋅Δ ⋅Δ + ⋅ +
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Germany: time-varying adjustment
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Comparison of the tv-coefficients
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